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THE CHORUS DOCTRINE: PROMOTING SUBNATIONAL DIPLOMACY IN REGIONAL GROWTH
MANAGEMENT
*

Conor J. Mannix

Abstract: Sub-national diplomacy, also known as paradiplomacy, occurs when subnational actors (think cities or states) engage in international relations, either with other subnational actors or nation-states. Though typically the province of foreign policy scholarship,
paradiplomacy touches on several legal issues, particularly where sovereignty and legal
frameworks collide. In the United States, the federal system established by the Constitution
gives individual states plenary power but reserves international relations to the federal
government through the Supremacy Clause. However, the lines between federal power and
state power with regards to international relations remain fuzzy.
Sub-national actors are taking advantage of this lack of sharply drawn lines to combat local,
regional, and global issues. This Comment examines what sub-national actors in the United
States can do on the international stage and details illustrative examples of previous attempts
and iterations of American paradiplomacy. This Comment, while focusing on the Pacific
Northwest, argues that the value and efficacy of these paradiplomatic efforts both encourage
their acceptance by the federal government and serve as a call for standardization and increased
federal oversight.

It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.1
–Justice Brandeis
INTRODUCTION
Nation states alone will not solve the global and regional problems of
the twenty-first century. The old-world international order is too large and
too slow—paralyzed by geopolitical rivalries and self-interest—to
address complex problems.2 Transnational issues such as climate change
require coordination and sacrifice, which are consistently lacking in the
*

J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2022. Thank you to the editorial
staff of Washington Law Review and Professor Hugh Spitzer for his invaluable feedback and advice.
A special thank you to my wife for her unconditional love and support, and my dog for her (treat)
conditional love.
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. See generally G. John Ikenberry, The End of Liberal International Order?, 94 INT’L AFFS. 7
(2018).
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Westphalian3 system of nation states.4 Paradoxically, solutions to these
problems may come from an even smaller source: a province, state, or
city.5 These sub-national actors can be nimble sources for desperately
needed innovation. Unfortunately, the traditional international order
works to exclude these sub-national actors from working together, both
within and outside their sovereign nation states.6
When sub-national actors along an international border wish to
coordinate with their foreign neighbors, they face physical, political, and
structural barriers.7 These barriers slow or prevent coordination on issues
in the real world based on constitutional power structures and an invisible
legal line of an international border.8 This is because the global
international community places a premium on international sovereignty,
so most countries have structured their national governments to retain
exclusive rights to officially engage with other international actors.9
Because the national governments are often hundreds, if not thousands, of
miles from the edges of their borders, sub-national actors on those distant
borders may find it difficult to get the national government’s full attention
on their issues.10 At the edges of a country’s geographic boundary,

3. See generally Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648–1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 20 (1948)
(arguing that the Peace of Westphalia is commonly considered the starting point of the modern
international order based on territorial sovereignty).
4. See Christian Lequesne & Stéphane Paquin, Federalism, Paradiplomacy and Foreign Policy: A
Case of Mutual Neglect, 22 INT’L NEGOT. 183 (2017).
5. Some international organizations are actively trying to implement the dissolution of the
Westphalian International Order and decentralize international relations power into local and regional
governments. See The Global Agenda of Local and Regional Governments, UNITED CITIES &
LOC. GOV’TS, https://www.uclg.org/en/agenda/global-agenda-of-local-regional-governments
[https://perma.cc/4EPY-LHT7].
6. See Chrystie Swiney, The Urbanization of International Law and International Relations: The
Rising Soft Power of Cities in Global Governance, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 227 (2020). But sub-national
actors do not always play nice with each other. See generally Richard C. Schragger, Federalism,
Metropolitanism, and the Problem of States, 105 VA. L. REV. 1537 (2019).
7. See Vivienne Bennett & Lawrence A. Herzog, U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts and
Institutional Change: A Commentary, 40 NAT. RES. J. 973 (2000). For a counterexample, look to the
European Union’s Schengen Zone, a supra-national solution to transborder issues. See Alan K.
Henrikson, Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach, 23 INT’L POL. SCI. REV.
437, 461 (2002).
8. See Gary Gallegos, Alejandro Mungaray & Juan Antonio Martinez, Building a Binational
Infrastructure: Can San Diego/Tijuana Become a 21st Century Megacity?, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
71 (2000).
9. See J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules
of Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT’L ORG. 107, 108 (1994).
10. See Alan K. Henrikson, Distance and Foreign Policy: A Political Geography Approach, 23
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 437, 449 (2002) (“[Often] the peripheral areas and populations of countries are
treated by the countries’ leaders, situated comfortably in national capitals, at or near their countries’
geographic centers, with relative indifference.”).
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international borders present a legal barrier for sub-national actors to
engage with their sub-national peers; but sub-national actors manage to
innovate around these restrictions.11
Despite structural hurdles, sub-national actors still find ways to engage
with each other across borders, and thereby engage in paradiplomacy.12
These engagements vary in scope and substance from cultural exchanges
and sister cities13 to formal diplomatic and economic relationships.14
Although paradiplomacy can sometimes refer to intra-national relations
(e.g., Kansas and Missouri), this Comment focuses on the international
form of paradiplomacy (e.g., California and Quebec).15
Although urbanization does not seem inherently negative, it factors into
many problems faced across the world, and climate change in particular.16
The world’s population has more than tripled in the past seventy years,
adding more than five billion people.17 At the same time, the world has
become more urban.18 The United Nations estimates nearly 70% of the

11. See Noé Cornago, Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy in the Redefinition of International Security:
Dimensions of Conflict and Cooperation, 9 REG’L & FED. STUD. 40 (1999).
12. The term and study of paradiplomacy originally comes from international relations scholarship.
A generally accepted definition explains paradiplomacy as “non-central governments’ involvement
in international relations through the establishment of permanent or ad hoc contacts with foreign
public or private entities, with the aim to promote socio-economic or cultural issues, as well as any
other foreign dimension of their constitutional competences.” See Cornago, supra note 11, at 40
(supplying a concise summary of paradiplomacy).
13. A sister city is a semi-diplomatic relationship between two cities in different countries. What Is
a Sister City?, SISTER CITIES INT’L, https://sistercities.org/about-us/what-is-a-sister-city-3/
[https://perma.cc/4ESE-WG8E].
14. See Swiney, supra note 6.
15. There are several terms for this paradiplomacy. See Thomas Jackson, Paradiplomacy and
Political Geography: The Geopolitics of Substate Regional Diplomacy, 12 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS,
Dec. 11, 2017, at 3–4 (listing the following definition synonyms for Paradiplomacy: microdiplomacy,
constituent diplomacy, multilayered diplomacy, regional diplomacy, sub-state diplomacy, catalytic
diplomacy, protodiplomacy, post-diplomacy); see also MICHAEL GLENNON & ROBERT SLOANE,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 35 (2016) (“local
internationalism”); Swiney, supra note 6, at 229 & n.11 (“glocal diplomacy,” a portmanteau of global
and local).
16. See Matthew Cobb & Alex Braithwaite, Urbanization: Poverty, Conflict, and Climate Change
as Causes and Consequences, in A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR POLITICAL DEMOGRAPHY 45 (Jennifer
D. Sciubba ed., 2021).
17. Mohammed Hadad, Infographic: How the World’s Population Tripled in 70 Years, AL
JAZEERA (July 11, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/11/infographic-how-the-worldspopulation-tripled-in-70-years [https://perma.cc/U8ZH-AKZ8]; see also U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and
Soc. Affs., Population Div., World Population Prospects 2019: Highlights, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/SER.A/423, at 5 (2019).
18. The definition of urban varies greatly, even within the U.N. dataset. See U.N. Dep’t of Econ.
and Soc. Affs., Population Div., World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/SER.A/420, at 1, 5 (2019).
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world’s population will live in an urban setting by 2050.19 Today, just
thirty-three megacities house more than one-eighth of the world’s
population.20 While urbanization can be a “positive force for economic
growth, poverty reduction and human development,”21 it is a doubleedged sword. Unchecked urbanization can lead to overwhelmed
infrastructure and worsens global warming.22
The complexity of these issues grows with the urbanization boom:
cities grow into megacities, which grow into megaregions.23 The frame of
this Comment is the Cascadia megaregion, comprised of three major
cities: Vancouver, British Columbia; Seattle, Washington; and Portland,
Oregon.24 The Cascadia megaregion is typical of many international
megaregions.25 It has seen fast population growth and withering
infrastructure investment and is comprised of national and sub-national
actors.26 Zooming in on one of the Cascadia megacities, the Seattle
metropolitan area alone saw an influx of nearly 800,000 people between
2010 and 2017.27
In Cascadia and across the United States, the effects of the recent rapid
growth in urban population were fueled by historic shifts in culture and
society.28 Tracing a line back to slavery through redlining, exclusionary
19. See id.
20. Megacities are defined by the United Nations as cities with more than 10 million inhabitants.
See id. at 55.
21. Id. at 1.
22. See Cobb & Braithwaite, supra note 16, at 50, 54–55.
23. Megaregions are highly populated and interconnected areas that span city, county, state, and
even international borders. See Olivia Posner, What Are Megaregions?, COOP. MOBILITY FOR
COMPETITIVE MEGAREGIONS, UNIV. TRANSP. CTR., https://sites.utexas.edu/cm2/what-aremegaregions [https://perma.cc/V5R9-SBLA].
24. See YOAV HAGLER, REG’L PLAN. ASS’N, DEFINING U.S. MEGAREGIONS (2009), https://s3.useast-1.amazonaws.com/rpa-org/pdfs/2050-Paper-Defining-US-Megaregions.pdf [https://perma.cc/
374V-V2ZQ].
25. See Richard Florida, The Real Powerhouses That Drive the World’s Economy, BLOOMBERG:
CITYLAB (Feb. 28, 2019, 6:57 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-28/mappin
g-the-mega-regions-powering-the-world-s-economy [https://perma.cc/K2VL-LGCL] (identifying
twenty-nine megaregions throughout the world).
26. See Brian Cochrane, B.C.’s Economic Recovery Hinges upon Massive, Sustained Infrastructure
Investment, VANCOUVER SUN (Jan. 18, 2022), https://vancouversun.com/sponsored/newssponsored/b-c-s-economic-recovery-hinges-upon-massive-sustained-infrastructure-investment
[https://perma.cc/JR6D-T8WP]; Amanda Arden, Oregon Infrastructure Needs Funding ‘at Much
Higher Level’, KOIN 6 NEWS (Sept. 1, 2021, 6:30 PM), https://www.koin.com/news/specialreports/oregon-infrastructure-needs-funding-at-much-higher-level/ [https://perma.cc/5HL2-6G99].
27. See Hanley Wood Data Studio, The Amazon Effect: Lessons Learned from Seattle, BUILDER
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.builderonline.com/money/economics/the-amazon-effect-lessonslearned-from-seattle [https://perma.cc/D3Y7-32A5].
28. See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the Consumer City, 43
URB. STUD. 1275, 1276–80 (2006).
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real estate practices limited where African Americans could live.29
American cities experienced an exodus of White people from the city to
the suburbs, the “white flight,”30 beginning post-World War II,
accelerating through the Civil Rights movement, and reaching its zenith
in the 1980s.31 So pervasive was this racial phenomenon that even the
terms “urban” and “suburban” became coded language.32 As people and
their tax dollars fled to the suburbs, cities saw a drastic drop in urban
investment and infrastructure funding.33
Now the exodus is reversing, however, and the suburban dream
dwindling.34 Partly driven by a cultural rejection of Baby Boomers’
suburbia, many young professionals now favor urban life.35 The influx of
new capital, including white, inter-generational wealth from the suburbs,
contributes to skyrocketing rent and real estate prices in urban centers.36
For underfunded city infrastructure and existing residents, the result is a
“hypergentrification” of urban centers.37
In Cascadia, cities that have been under-resourced for decades are now
29. DAVID M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN
SUBURBAN AMERICA 4–9 (2007).
30. See William H. Frey, Central City White Flight: Racial and Nonracial Causes, 44 AM. SOCIO.
REV. 425, 426–27 (1979); see also Bethany Y. Li, Now Is the Time!: Challenging Resegregation and
Displacement in the Age of Hypergentrification, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1189 (2016) (explaining that
“white flight” not only reinforced racial and socio-economic segregation but removed capital in the
form of tax revenues from the city budgets, in turn leading to stagnation of urban infrastructure).
31. See Frey, supra note 30.
32. See Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and Suburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a ‘RaceMaking Situation’, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 750 (2002) (“‘[S]uburban’ and ‘urban’ often
function as racial shorthand—suburban for ‘White’ and urban for ‘Black.’”).
33. See James A. Kushner, Affordable Housing as Infrastructure in the Time of Global Warming,
42 URB. LAW. 179, 186–87 (2010); Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 28, at 1276–80.
34. See Frederick Peters, The Rise and Fall of the Suburbs, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2019, 9:03 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/fredpeters/2019/08/14/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-suburbs/?sh=
d0c073a54991 [https://perma.cc/C5NQ-6GKR]; see also John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer,
Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of
Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 436–37 (2003).
35. See Powell & Spencer, supra note 34, at 436–37; see also JOSEPH CORTRIGHT, CEOS FOR
CITIES, THE YOUNG AND RESTLESS IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1 (2005), https://forwardcities.org
/old/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Young-and-Restless-in-a-Knowledge-Economy.pdf [http://perma.
cc/AQK3-VLJV] (explaining that urban centers have increasingly become the residential destination
of choice for young college graduates); Glaeser & Gottlieb, supra note 28, at 1276–80.
36. See Wendell Pritchett & Shitong Qiao, Exclusionary Megacities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 467
(2018); see also Swati Prakash, Racial Dimensions of Property Value Protection under the Fair
Housing Act, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1437 (2013); Gene Balk, As Seattle Gentrifies, One-Quarter of
Recent Movers Were Forced Out, Survey Shows, SEATTLE TIMES (July 26, 2020, 3:56 PM),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/data/as-seattle-gentrifies-one-quarter-of-recent-moverswere-forced-out-survey-shows [http://perma.cc/3DMR-MZ56].
37. See Li, supra note 30; see also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Unjust Cities?: Gentrification,
Integration, and the Fair Housing Act, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 835 (2019).
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feeling the two-fold effects of rapid urbanization and climate change
straining their infrastructure.38 Like most large American cities, Seattle is
scrambling to reinvest in its infrastructure, from transportation39 to
sewage.40 In Portland, recent heat waves have buckled city streets,
illustrating the effects of underfunded infrastructure paired with the
increasing threat of climate change.41 Vancouver also faces similar
infrastructure pressures from urbanization42 and climate change.43
The threat posed by climate change is not unique to the Cascadia
megaregion, but its impact is shockingly apparent.44 As global
temperatures increase, so too do the temperatures and extreme weather in
the historically mild Pacific Northwest.45 The summer heat wave of 2021
did not just set new record high temperatures, it did so by as much as five
degrees Celsius.46 The heat wave would not have been possible without
climate change.47 The effects of climate change go beyond just warmer
38. See RHYS ROTH, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE, INFRASTRUCTURE CRISIS,
SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS: RETHINKING OUR INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 4–6
(Craig Partridge ed., 2014), http://centerforsi.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/CSI-InfrastructureCrisis-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ7D-GPRC].
39. See Heidi Groover, Seattle Scales Back Earthquake Work on City Bridges as Costs Soar,
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 21, 2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/transportation/seattle-scales-back-earthquake-work-on-city-bridges-as-costs-soar
[https://perma.cc/65ZT-W887].
40. See Pritchett & Qiao, supra note 36; David Fox, Halting Urban Sprawl: Smart Growth in
Vancouver and Seattle, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 43 (2010); see also Jonathan Rosenbloom,
Fifty Shades of Gray Infrastructure: Land Use and the Failure to Create Resilient Cities, 93 WASH.
L. REV. 317 (2018).
41. See Mark Puleo, Records Smashed Again: Portland Infrastructure Crumbles under 116-Degree
Heat, ACCUWEATHER (July 1, 2021, 12:49 AM), https://www.accuweather.com/en/weathernews/portland-infrastructure-crumbles-record-116-degree-heat/970936 [https://perma.cc/Z3HQCY62].
42. See Frances Bula, Mad Dash to Build Vancouver Housing Leaves Infrastructure Behind,
GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/british-columbia/articlemad-dash-to-build-vancouver-housing-leaves-infrastructure-behind/ [https://perma.cc/PY8L-SS3D].
43. See Ian Austen & Vjosa Isai, Vancouver Is Marooned by Flooding and Besieged Again by
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/21/canadaflooding-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/UDG4-UE8R].
44. See Oliver Milman, ‘Nowhere Is Safe’: Heat Shatters Vision of Pacific North-West as Climate
Refuge, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2021, 2:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jul/21/
pacific-northwest-heatwave-dome-climate-change [https://perma.cc/LEE6-W8MD].
45. See Carolyn Gramling, Human-Driven Climate Change Sent Pacific Northwest Temperatures
Soaring, SCIENCENEWS (July 7, 2021, 7:28 PM), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/human-drivenclimate-change-pacific-northwest-heat-wave-temperatures [https://perma.cc/B55Q-MF2M].
46. See id.
47. See SJOUKJE Y. PHILIP, SARAH F. KEW, GEERT JAN VAN OLDENBORGH, WENCHANG YANG,
GABRIEL A. VECCHI, FARON S. ANSLOW, SIHAN LI, SONIA I. SENEVIRATNE, LINH N. LUU, JULIE
ARRIGHI, ROOP SINGH, MAARTEN VAN AALST, MATHIAS HAUSER, DOMINIK L. SCHUMACHER,
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weather, as increased temperatures result in drier conditions and more
forest fires.48 Furthermore, floods and landslides are more likely in the
aftermath of a forest fire.49 Unfortunately, the international system
continues to drag its feet on addressing climate change.50
When American sub-national actors face urgent issues that span
international borders, national responses are often stymied by the slowmoving and fickle federal government.51 Three factors bog down federal
responses: the complexity of the federal administrative state,52 partisan
rancor and obstructionism in Congress,53 and reversals of executive
branch policy every four to eight years.54 Against this backdrop, the
federal government struggles to address the international problems that
affect state and local governments.55 Furthermore, macro-level federal
interventions are often too broad and slow to address local issues alone.56
CAROLINA PEREIRA MARGHIDAN, KRISTIE L. EBI, RÉMY BONNET, ROBERT VAUTARD, JORDIS
TRADOWSKY, DIM COUMOU, FLAVIO LEHNER, MICHAEL WEHNER, CHRIS RODELL, ROLAND STULL,
ROSIE HOWARD, NATHAN GILLETT & FRIEDERIKE OTTO, WORLD WEATHER ATTRIBUTION, RAPID
ATTRIBUTION ANALYSIS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY HEATWAVE ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF THE US
AND CANADA JUNE 2021 (2021), https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/wp-content/uploads/NWUS-extreme-heat-2021-scientific-report-WWA.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7ZM-54FD].
48. See Jessica E. Halofsky, David L. Peterson & Brian J. Harvey, Changing Wildfire, Changing
Forests: The Effects of Climate Change on Fire Regimes and Vegetation in the Pacific Northwest,
USA, 16 FIRE ECOLOGY, Jan. 27, 2020.
49. See Cal. Water Sci. Ctr., Post-Fire Flooding and Debris Flow, USGS (June 5, 2018),
https://www.usgs.gov/centers/california-water-science-center/science/post-fire-flooding-and-debrisflow#overview [https://perma.cc/W3FD-GW8B]; see also Austen & Isai, supra note 43.
50. See Editorial, World Leaders Are Failing Our Future Generations on Climate Change, WASH.
POST (Oct. 6, 2019, 5:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/world-leaders-are-failingour-future-generations-on-climate-change/2019/10/06/625a92f8-e618-11e9-a331-2df12d56
a80b_story.html [https://perma.cc/23GY-YAP8].
51. The whipsawing of administration priorities from the Obama Administration to the Trump
Administration to the Biden Administration demonstrates the volatility in leadership and priorities.
Cf. Philip A. Wallach & Justus Myers, The Federal Government’s Coronavirus Response—Public
Health Timeline, BROOKINGS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-federalgovernments-coronavirus-actions-and-failures-timeline-and-themes/ [https://perma.cc/F4G2-F6TF].
52. See Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121,
157 (2016).
53. See Joseph P. Tomain, Gridlock, Lobbying, and Democracy, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 87,
88 (2017).
54. See Richard Haass, Present at the Disruption: How Trump Unmade U.S. Foreign Policy, 99
FOREIGN AFFS., Sept.–Oct. 2020, at 24, 34.
55. See Edward Sullivan & A. Dan Tarlock, The Western Urban Landscape and Climate Change,
49 ENV’T L. 931 (2019); THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD & KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY GLOBAL
COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST (2013).
56. See Jeff Stein, Trump’s 2016 Campaign Pledges on Infrastructure Have Fallen Short, Creating
Opening for Biden, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2020, 11:32 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/uspolicy/2020/10/18/trump-biden-infrastructure-2020/ [https://perma.cc/3BFG-WNJT]; Sheila R.
Foster, The Limits of Mobility and the Persistence of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE L.J.F. 480 (2017);
Swiney, supra note 6.
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Enter the humble sub-national actor: the province, state, or city.57 Where
the federal government is too slow,58 too distracted by domestic issues,59
acting against local interests,60 or uninterested in leading,61 sub-national
actors may feel the need to act on behalf of their constituents.62
However, American cities and states have historically been prevented
from engaging in meaningful international relations.63 American
paradiplomacy faces legal hurdles and outright constitutional
prohibitions.64 Although the Constitution reserves to states all powers not
specifically granted to the federal government,65 it does grant the power
to make treaties and compacts with other nations to the federal
government.66 Furthermore, the federal government carved out almost all
other international relations powers through Supreme Court jurisprudence
and federal preemption.67 The Supreme Court distills these concepts into
the One Voice Doctrine: state laws or actions that “prevent this Nation
from ‘speaking with one voice’ in regulating foreign commerce” are
unconstitutional.68 Perhaps owing to the strength of the One Voice
Doctrine and clarity of constitutional prohibitions, the literature and
jurisprudence regarding sub-national actors in the United States forming
agreements and compacts with other international sub-national actors is

57. See Swiney, supra note 6.
58. See David Cooper & Jaimie Worker, The Coronavirus Pandemic Requires State and Local
Policymakers to Act, in Addition to Demanding a Strong Federal Response, ECON. POL’Y INST.:
WORKING ECON. BLOG (Mar. 17, 2020, 11:41 AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/the-coronaviruspandemic-requires-state-and-local-policymakers-to-act-in-addition-to-demanding-a-strong-federalresponse [https://perma.cc/TE52-H57M].
59. See David Jackson, Trump Says Impeachment ‘Probably’ Distracted Him from Fighting
Coronavirus, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2020, 5:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2020/03/31/coronavirus-trump-says-impeachment-distracted-him-coronavirus/5100694002
[https://perma.cc/J4NZ-4AFK].
60. See Taryn Luna & Tony Barboza, Gov. Gavin Newsom Blasts Trump at Climate Event: ‘I’m
Absolutely Humiliated’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2019, 3:49 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/
story/2019-09-23/gavin-newsom-un-climate-change-event-new-york (last visited May 26, 2022).
61. See Brian Bennett, COVID-19 Is Spiking—and Donald Trump Has Pulled a ‘Disappearance
Act’, TIME (Nov. 18, 2020, 9:25 AM), https://time.com/5912675/donald-trump-president-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/A32F-R59F].
62. See Swiney, supra note 6.
63. See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original
Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 341–48 (1999).
64. See infra Part II.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
66. See infra Part II.A.
67. See id.
68. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).
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sparse at best.69
This Comment builds on the emerging legal literature on American
paradiplomacy by focusing on the Cascadia megaregion in the Pacific
Northwest. It shines a light into the less-explored corners of American
foreign policy powers, searching for any remaining room for cities and
states to occupy. The growing problems of megacities and megaregions
within the United States highlight the impacts of climate change and
decaying infrastructure. The Supreme Court’s One Voice Doctrine should
not mean that only a single voice can be heard but rather should allow the
many voices of sub-national actors to sing in harmony. The federal
government should endeavor to loosen the restrictions on sub-national
actors and allow them to become the “happy incident”70 laboratories for
the country again.
Part I describes and places paradiplomacy in the context of the current
international community and explores the challenges of addressing global
issues at this level. Part II examines the constitutional restrictions on state
and local involvement in international affairs. Part III examines past
attempts and examples of American paradiplomacy. Part IV describes
issues facing the Cascadia megaregion and historical examples of
paradiplomacy in the region, and analyzes their respective successes and
structures. Part V proposes that the federal government should embrace
and encourage—rather than fighting or ignoring—American sub-national
governments’ efforts to engage their international counterparts to address
issues.
I.

SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS AND PARADIPLOMACY

For nearly 400 years, international affairs has primarily been the
province of nation states.71 However, urbanization is shifting the balance
of power towards cities and states.72 Accordingly, paradiplomacy has
“broaden[ed] the universe of international affairs, in which [nations] are
no longer the sole actors.”73 The definition of paradiplomacy is both broad
and flexible: it can refer to sub-national governments like cities or states,
69. This Comment focuses on the United States law and jurisprudence regarding sub-national
actors engaging with their international peers. For an exploration of how Canadian law impacts such
agreements, see David V. Wright, Cross-Border Constraints on Climate Change Agreements: Legal
Risks in the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Linkage, 46 ENV’T L. REP. 10478, 10488–90 (2016).
70. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
71. See Gross, supra note 3, at 20.
72. See Schragger, supra note 6.
73. See Michael Keating, Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and Strategies,
in PARADIPLOMACY IN ACTION: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 1, 6
(Francisco Aldecoa & Michael Keating eds., 1999).
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or non-state actors like international advocacy organizations.74 However,
for this Comment, the working definition of paradiplomacy is subnational governments engaging in official international relations with
actors outside of their national sovereign.75
Paradiplomacy fills the widening gap created by nation states’
dominance over international relations and their inability to manage an
increasingly complex and interconnected world.76 Nowhere is this more
apparent than in the countless failed attempts to address climate change at
the international level.77 Addressing climate change requires nation states
to put aside their self-interest for the greater good: they face the “freerider” problem78 without effective enforcement mechanisms.79 Around the
world, sub-national actors grow tired of gridlock and call for a
reimagining of international affairs orthodoxy.80 Some advocate for
greater integration of sub-national actors into—or creation of new—
regional81 or global82 supranational organizations.83
Cities, states, and provinces must begin to assert themselves and define
their own international role in the realms of economic development,

74. See ANDRÉ LECOURS, DISCUSSION PAPERS IN DIPLOMACY: POLITICAL ISSUES OF
PARADIPLOMACY: LESSONS FROM THE DEVELOPED WORLD 1, 2–3 (Virginie Duthoit & Ellen Huijgh
eds., 2008).
75. This is, of course, a major simplification. For a more detailed and nuanced exploration of
paradiplomacy, see RODRIGO TAVARES, PARADIPLOMACY: CITIES AND STATES AS GLOBAL PLAYERS
(2016).
76. See Richard Falk, What Comes After Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge, 13 WIDENER L.
REV. 243, 244 (2007).
77. See Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The
Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 190–94 (2005); see also Lindsay Maizland, Global
Climate Agreements: Successes and Failures, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Nov. 17, 2021, 2:30 PM),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/paris-global-climate-change-agreements [https://perma.cc/TPX769QB] (including the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and 2015 Paris Agreement as notable failures).
78. The free-rider problem is an economic theory where certain members of a group benefit from
something without contributing to the creation of the benefit. In the global warming context, the
benefit would be a habitable world and the contribution would be reducing green-house gas emissions.
Some nations are reluctant to bear the cost of the reductions if others refuse to reduce yet enjoy the
benefit of the reducing nations. Cf. Engel & Saleska, supra note 77, at 190–94.
79. See Charles Lipson, International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs, 37 WORLD
POL. 1, 3 (1984).
80. See infra Part III. The growth of paradiplomatic organizations, such as the United Cities and
Local Governments, C40, and other international organizations comprised of sub-national
governments.
81. I.e., the European Union.
82. I.e., the United Nations.
83. See Falk, supra note 76, at 244 (discussing the “emergence of a different structure of world
order that is sufficiently receptive to the emergence of supranational forms of regional and global
governance, as well as exhibiting the agency of non-state actors, as to qualify as ‘post-Westphalian’”).
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environmental issues, and regional community building.84 The form and
substance of these roles will be shaped and curbed by prevailing
international and intranational systems and norms.85 Beyond the basic
structural limitations on their foreign relations powers, sub-national actors
in the United States must contend with a polarized and often-gridlocked
national government.86
A.

Paradiplomacy’s Parameters

In its simplest iteration, paradiplomacy is sub-national actors engaging
with the international community.87 However, unpacking the “who,”
“what,” and “how” reveals the complexity of paradiplomacy through the
number of potential permutations.88 Paradiplomatic actors can be any
entity below the nation state level and do not need to be officially
recognized units within the traditional governmental structure.89 Further,
the form of paradiplomacy varies greatly, from traditional diplomacy to
coalition-building to economic agreements.90 Modern examples of
paradiplomacy are municipal or state government action on climate, trade,
or civil society.91 These actions can be direct relations with another nation
state or sub-national government, or indirect relations through
84. See Swiney, supra note 6, at 229–30.
85. See Stephen Tierney, Reframing Sovereignty? Sub-State National Societies and Contemporary
Challenges to the Nation-State, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 161, 162 (2005).
86. See Earl H. Fry, The Role of U.S. State Governments in International Relations, 1980–2015, 22
INT’L NEGOT. 205, 232 (2017).
87. See Swiney, supra note 6, at 227.
88. See Joana Setzer, Testing the Boundaries of Subnational Diplomacy: The International Climate
Action of Local and Regional Governments, 4 TRANSNAT’L ENV’T L. 319 (2015).
89. See id. For an illuminating example, see the chart of government agencies involved in the
implementation of a hypothetical autonomous vehicle lane between Vancouver and Seattle. Margot
Young, Justin Choi, Kate Gotziaman, Hugh Spitzer, Greyson Blue & Dylan Olson, Cascadia L.
Initiative, Comparison of British Columbia and Washington State City Powers 105–06 (2020)
[hereinafter “CLI Paper”] (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstra
ct_id=3580956 [https://perma.cc/8GV8-FMCG].
90. See Setzer, supra note 88, at 319, 326 n.38 (summarizing seven forms of paradiplomacy:
“(i) political representation abroad; (ii) treaty-making power; (iii) entering into agreements of a
formalized nature (political declarations of intent and/or cooperation agreements, transnational
contracts, and cultural agreements and partnerships); (iv) developing [programs] of assistance and
sharing of know-how (bilateral or multilateral [programs], [programs] on cross boundary
cooperation); (v) participating in multilateral frameworks and organizations (observing or
participating in technical committees, becoming an associate member of multilateral organizations);
(vi) participation in formal or informal networks; and (vii) developing a public diplomacy, both
domestic and international” (citing David Criekemans, Regional Sub-State Diplomacy from a
Comparative Perspective: Quebec, Scotland, Bavaria, Catalonia, Wallonia and Flanders, 5 HAGUE
J. DIPL. 37, 37–46 (2010))).
91. See Fry, supra note 86, at 232; Swiney, supra note 6, at 229–30.
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international communities and non-profit organizations.92 Examples of
indirect paradiplomacy are informal cooperative networks furthering
education or cultural ideas,93 integration into supranational agendas,94
formal networks mirroring nation state-based international coalitions,95
and creating international local law where possible.96 Paradiplomacy can
even be a sub-national independence group (Kosovo97 or South Sudan98)
establishing diplomatic ties with other members of the international
community.99
Paradiplomacy’s breadth is primarily constrained and defined by the
delegation of powers and sovereignty between a national government and
sub-national actor.100 Nation states vary in how they structure their
international relations powers; the North American federal system of
government is a distinct international minority.101 Interestingly, some
nation states grant broader international powers to sub-national actors
than they reserve for their national government, although this is by far the
exception, not the rule.102 One example of this unique internal power

92. See Nina Hachigian, Cities Will Determine the Future of Diplomacy, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 16,
2019, 9:21 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/16/cities-will-determine-the-future-ofdiplomacy [https://perma.cc/LC6A-G3YW].
93. The United Cities and Local Government organization is a “global network of cities and local,
regional, and metropolitan governments and their associations . . . committed to representing,
defending, and amplifying the voices of local and regional governments to leave no-one and no place
behind.” Who We Are, UNITED CITIES & LOC. GOV’T, https://www.uclg.org/en/organisation/about
[https://perma.cc/XEA9-VFF2]. The organization strives to improve and empower local governments
to address global issues in the absence of cohesive international leadership. What Is Our Global
Agenda?, UNITED CITIES & LOC. GOV’T, https://www.uclg.org/en/agenda/global-agenda-of-localregional-governments [https://perma.cc/8LXT-MAEF].
94. The U.S. Climate Alliance is one example of sub-national actors (U.S. States, through their
Governors) taking action in furtherance of the goals of the Paris Agreement in the absence of Federal
leadership. See Alliance Principles, U.S. CLIMATE ALL., http://www.usclimatealliance.org/allianceprinciples [https://perma.cc/ZXN7-WNPW].
95. The C40 organization is a collection of ninety-seven of the world’s largest major international
cities that are banding together. The mayors of the C40 cities represent more than 700 million citizens
and one quarter of the global economy and are focused on delivering on the most ambitious goals of
the Paris Agreement at the local level. About C40, C40 CITIES, https://www.c40.org/about
[https://perma.cc/3V9Q-JELC].
96. See Swiney, supra note 6, at 229–30.
97. See Jure Vidmar, International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 42
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779 (2009).
98. See Salman M.A. Salman, South Sudan Road to Independence: Broken Promises and Lost
Opportunities, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 343 (2013).
99. See Tierney, supra note 85, at 162 (citing Basque and Quebecois independence movements as
examples of paradiplomatic efforts).
100. See id.
101. See Fry, supra note 86, at 210.
102. See LECOURS, supra note 74, at 7–8.
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structure is that of Belgian provinces; they are constitutionally required to
ratify international positions and are empowered to veto proposed
treaties.103 Although facets of paradiplomacy can be found throughout the
international arena, modern American paradiplomacy has only recently
emerged.104
B.

Federal Failures

American cities and states are finding solutions to global problems
because the federal government too often fails to lead. Polarized politics
in the U.S. is not new,105 but the severity of its effects seem to be growing:
a perpetually gridlocked Congress106 and the bi-polarization of American
foreign policy when the Oval Office changes parties.107 An incumbent
party loss can undo four to eight years of progress and policies.108 The
election of Donald Trump in 2016 was fueled, in large part, by antipathy
to the Obama administration.109 Trump’s isolationist “America First”
diplomacy reversed the neo-liberal international priorities and policies of
the Obama administration.110 Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 Paris
Climate Accords—and Biden’s subsequent recommittal—proved that
America’s position on issues could shift dramatically every four years.111
This instability underscores why American cities and states cannot count

103. See id.
104. See Swiney, supra note 6, at 229–30.
105. See David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A Computational Analysis of
Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (2019).
106. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2117 (2013)
(relating a personal anecdote about a Senator stating that his opposition to a bill was not about policy,
but about simply blocking the bill); see also Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2065, 2086 (2013) (suggesting that the polarization of Congress is reflective of a more
polarized nation, such that gridlock is not a symptom of Congressional dysfunction, but American
dysfunction).
107. See Haass, supra note 54, 27–28.
108. See Lisa Freidman, Trump Wants to Repeal Obama’s Climate Plan. The Next Fight: Its
Replacement, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/climate/cleanpower-plan.html [https://perma.cc/7B5P-KPEU].
109. Of course, many political commentators and researchers also fault the rise in social media
misinformation campaigns, among others. See Anthony Gaughan, Explaining Donald Trump’s Shock
Election Win, SCI. AM. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/explainingdonald-trump-s-shock-election-win [https://perma.cc/78L4-FGDE].
110. See J. Timmons Roberts, Undermining a Weak Agreement: Fossil Capitalism, Neoliberal
Climate Governance, Paris and a Just Transition After Trump, 33 CONN. J. INT’L L. 425 (2018). See
generally America First Foreign Policy, WHITE HOUSE, https://web.archive.org/web/201702240119
56/https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).
111. See Paris Climate Deal: Trump Pulls US out of 2015 Accord, BBC NEWS (June 1, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40127326 [https://perma.cc/RXW3-NKL8].
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on the federal government to solve global problems.112
Two interrelated crises, climate change and urbanization, further
illustrate the ineffectiveness of a fickle and slow federal government.113
Climate change is one of the most complex issues in modern international
diplomacy; it requires political commitments for wholesale environmental
regulatory reform and expensive infrastructure investments from all
industrialized countries.114 Unfortunately, these required reforms face
widespread apathy, skepticism, misinformation, and complacence.115 In
the United States, congressional partisan gridlock continues to block
meaningful federal greenhouse gas legislation, despite a majority of
Americans agreeing on its importance.116
The federal government also does little to help cities and states by way
of supplying infrastructure funding and mitigating the effects of
urbanization and climate change.117 One result is that urbanization and
climate change are hastening the decay of the already-crumbling
infrastructure of the United States.118 Examples of America’s decrepit
infrastructure abound: the I-35W bridge collapse in Minneapolis,119
California’s rolling blackouts and wildfires,120 collapsed levees in New

112. See Freidman, supra note 108.
113. See Cobb & Braithwaite, supra note 16.
114. See Sander Chan, Clara Brandi & Steffen Bauer, Aligning Transnational Climate Action with
International Climate Governance: The Road from Paris, 25 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENV’T L. 238,
238–39 (2016).
115. See Aaron M. McCright, The Polarization of U.S. Public Opinion on Climate Change,
SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (Jan. 1, 2013), https://scholars.org/contribution/polarization-uspublic-opinion-climate-change [https://perma.cc/4FMB-32AN]; see CARY FUNK & BRIAN KENNEDY,
PEW RSCH. CTR. THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE (2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2016/10/PS_2016.10.04_Politics-of-Climate_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V7AF-8Y2B].
116. See Brian Kennedy, Most Americans Say Climate Change Affects Their Local Community,
Including 70% Living Near the Coast, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 29, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.o
rg/fact-tank/2020/06/29/most-americans-say-climate-change-impacts-their-community-but-effectsvary-by-region-2 [https://perma.cc/E632-YBXX].
117. I acknowledge that President Biden and the Democrats were able to pass an infrastructure bill,
although several crucial climate change provisions were left out. See Jim Tankersley, How Biden Got
the Infrastructure Deal Trump Couldn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/202
1/07/29/business/economy/biden-infrastructure-deal.html [https://perma.cc/YT6U-GVJX].
118. See Rosenbloom, supra note 40; Cobb & Braithwaite, supra note 16, at 45.
119. See David Schaper, 10 Years After Bridge Collapse, America Is Still Crumbling, NPR (Aug.
1, 2017, 9:52 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/08/01/540669701/10-years-after-bridge-collapseamerica-is-still-crumbling [https://perma.cc/2T3R-VAAR].
120. See Sammy Roth, What Caused California’s Rolling Blackouts? Climate Change and Poor
Planning, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2020, 7:03 PM), https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/202010-06/california-rolling-blackouts-climate-change-poor-planning (last visited May 26, 2022).

Mannix (Do Not Delete)

2022]

6/21/22 11:06 AM

THE CHORUS DOCTRINE

641

Orleans during Hurricane Katrina,121 and the Flint water crisis.122
America’s decaying infrastructure reflects both national and local
neglect.123 The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) grades the
infrastructure of the United States every four years.124 Akin to climate
change, the United States has consistently failed to address the
infrastructure issue, earning a D+ in both 2013 and 2017.125 In 2019,
Oregon earned a C- and Washington fared only slightly better with a C.126
The 2021 national report card marks the first time since ASCE began
issuing report cards that the United States has received higher than a D,
earning a C-.127
A warmer and more urban future awaits the Cascadia megaregion.128
History shows that the international order and federal government are
unreliable partners for cities and states facing extreme weather and
crumbling infrastructure.129 Unfortunately for the cities and states who
would like to reach beyond the borders of the U.S., they are silenced by
121. See Adrienne Lafrance, A Brief History of Levees, ATLANTIC (Aug. 31, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/a-brief-history-of-levees/402119
[https://perma.cc/32A4-WECA].
122. See Joseph W. Kane & Robert Puentes, Flint’s Water Crisis Highlights Need for
Infrastructure Investment and Innovation, BROOKINGS: THE AVENUE (Jan. 13, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2016/01/13/flints-water-crisis-highlights-need-forinfrastructure-investment-and-innovation [https://perma.cc/E8D2-HMAT].
123. See Kevin Longley, ASCE 2021 Infrastructure Report Card Gives U.S. ‘C-’ Grade, ASCE
(Mar. 4, 2021), https://infrastructurereportcard.org/asce-2021-infrastructure-report-card-gives-u-s-cgrade [https://perma.cc/Y6Z7-KSVQ].
124. See Pamela Engel, 10 Signs That US Infrastructure Is a Disaster, BUS. INSIDER (July 30, 2013,
3:33 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/10-signs-that-us-infrastructure-is-a-disaster-2013-7
[https://perma.cc/U8KN-DJA9]; Tim Hornyak, Crisis in America: A Crumbling Infrastructure,
CNBC (Apr. 11, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2013/11/21/crisis-in-america-acrumbling-infrastructure.html [https://perma.cc/BD2S-4N5Y]; Hearing on Our Nation’s Crumbling
Infrastructure and the Need for Immediate Action Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 116th
Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of Gregory DiLoreto, Am. Soc’y of Civ. Eng’rs).
125. See AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD (2018),
https://2017.infrastructurereportcard.org [https://perma.cc/E78V-TWBH]; AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL
ENG’RS, 2013 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD (2014), https://2013.infrastructurereportcard.org
[https://perma.cc/YMC2-7HVM].
126. See AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2019 WASHINGTON INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD,
https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2019-WA-InfrastructureReport-Card.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7CS-5FZ7]; AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2019 OREGON
INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD, https://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/10/FullReport-OR_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK4S-UWP2].
127. See Longley, supra note 123.
128. See, e.g., James Brasuell, Cascadia Expects Millions of New Residents. Should It Build New
Cities or New Density?, PLANETIZEN (Nov. 30, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.planetizen.com/news/
2020/11/111373-cascadia-expects-millions-new-residents-should-it-build-new-cities-or-new
[https://perma.cc/A8BB-EVUN].
129. See generally Cobb & Braithwaite, supra note 16, at 45.
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the federal government’s supremacy over international relations and the
One Voice Doctrine.
II.

THE ONE VOICE DOCTRINE

In the United States, paradiplomacy faces several constitutional
hurdles, chief among them being the notion that the nation must speak
with “one voice” in foreign affairs.130 The principle of the federal
government as the sole arbiter of international relations extends back to
the founding of the country.131 Through the Supremacy Clause,132
legislation, and landmark court cases over the years, the unenumerated
foreign relations powers have been captured by the federal government.133
The U.S. Supreme Court aided in this capture by creating the One
Voice Doctrine, which “maintains that in its external relations the United
States must be able to speak with one voice in order to achieve its interests
and avoid negative responses from other nations.”134 The One Voice
Doctrine has roots that extend back to 1832.135 The Doctrine itself is a
collection of Supreme Court jurisprudence that prohibits sub-national
actors from engaging in foreign affairs based on the Court’s
interpretations of—and the explicit restraints in—the Treaty and
Compact Clauses of the U.S. Constitution,136 as well as the implicit
restraints
of
the
Foreign Commerce
and
137
Dormant Foreign Affairs Clauses.
130. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
131. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not
to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for
the conduct of its members.”).
132. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land . . . .”)
133. For an examination of unenumerated foreign relations powers and their capture, see Louis
Henkin, “A More Effective System” for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional Framework, 61 VA. L.
REV. 751, 752–54 (1975) and Cheng-Yi Huang, Unenumerated Power and the Rise of Executive
Primacy, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 395 (2019).
134. See David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 954 (2014).
135. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the ‘One-Voice’ Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 975, 980 (2001) (citing Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) as one of the
first cases invalidating state laws in foreign affairs).
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation . . . .”); id. cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . . .”).
137. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1230–31 (1999) (discussing the history of the Dormant Foreign Affairs
power).
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Explicit Restraints: The Treaty Clause and Compact Clause

The power to enter into, and approve, legally binding agreements with
other international actors is clearly granted to the federal government
through the text of the Treaty and Compact Clauses of the U.S.
Constitution.138 The Treaty Clause states that “[n]o State shall enter into
any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”139 The Compact Clause similarly
states that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power.”140 The language of “[n]o State shall” found in both clauses is
unambiguous in its prohibition of states entering into agreements with a
“foreign Power.”141
The Treaty Clause has been the subject of very few legal challenges—
scholars have suggested that this “thin” case law may be due to the
clause’s “relative clarity.”142 Most Treaty Clause challenges are nearly a
century old.143 For the few cases it has seen, the Supreme Court has been
decisive in keeping the ability to enter into treaties solely a federal
power.144
The most impactful case in asserting the “independent and exclusive

138. See U.S. CONST art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation . . . .”); id. cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power . . . .”).
139. See id. cl. 1.
140. See id. cl. 3.
141. See id. cl. 1; id. cl. 3.
142. See David V. Wright, Cross-Border Constraints on Climate Change Agreements: Legal Risks
in the California-Quebec Cap-and-Trade Linkage, 46 ENV’T L. REP. 10478, 10487–88 (2016). For a
critique of the federal hegemony over the treaty power see Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating
Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127, 1138 (2000), but
compare with J. MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE 57 (1946) (“Yet no American court has defined a treaty [as a state
agreement with an international actor]. There appears to be a vicious circle: treaties must be ratified
by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. If we ask what is a treaty, for this
purpose, the answer is: any agreement which has been so ratified.”).
143. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (quoting Burnet
v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933) (“As a nation with all the attributes of sovereignty, the United States
is vested with all the powers of government necessary to maintain an effective control of international
relations.”)); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,
519 (1893) (finding that only treaties “of a political character” are subject to Article I).
144. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (“When a State enters the Union, it
surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives. Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions [and] it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or
India . . . .”). But see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 152 (2d ed.
1996) (“No agreement between a state and a foreign power has been successfully challenged on the
ground that it is a treaty which the state was forbidden to make.”).
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[federal] foreign affairs power”145 is United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.146 Despite revolving around a constitutional delegation-ofpower issue between the executive and legislative branches, the dicta in
Curtiss-Wright have served to exclude states from engaging in
international relations.147 The Court’s holding sourced the exclusivity of
the federal government’s treaty-making power in the very nature of
sovereignty, not just the U.S. Constitution.148 This expansive reading of
federal authority over the treaty power has stood unchanged.
The Compact Clause draws more notice and attention owing to its less
absolute language.149 The Supreme Court first contemplated the
Compact Clause in Holmes v. Jennison.150 Chief Justice Taney’s plurality
decision required congressional consent for “every agreement, written or
verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual
understanding of the parties.”151 Although never expressly overruled,
“Taney’s absolutist vision of the Compact Clause”152 has been replaced
with Justice Field’s test from Virginia v. Tennessee.153 Field’s opinion was
that the Compact Clause only applied to agreements that threatened the
balance of federalism by “increas[ing] . . . political power in the states” at
the expense of federal supremacy.154 The Court’s modern jurisprudence
favors Field’s “federal supremacy test,” which also holds that because not
every agreement will threaten federal supremacy, not every agreement or
compact requires congressional approval.155 Importantly, the Court’s
Compact Clause jurisdiction has focused on domestic compacts between
145. See Edward A. Purcell Jr., Understanding Curtiss-Wright, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 653, 653
(2013).
146. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
147. Id. at 311.
148. Id. at 318 (“[T]he powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants
of the Constitution . . . but in the law of nations.”).
149. See Thomas Liefke Eaton, Reanimating the Foreign Compacts Clause, 45 WM. & MARY
ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 29, 30–31 (2020).
150. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 571–72 (1840) (“[S]tates are forbidden to enter into any ‘agreement’ or
‘compact’ with a foreign nation; and as these words could not have been idly or superfluously used
by the framers of the Constitution, they cannot be construed to mean the same thing with the word
‘treaty.’ They evidently mean something more, and were designed to make the prohibition more
comprehensive.”).
151. See id. at 572.
152. See Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 MO. L. REV. 1071, 1086 (2008).
153. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
154. See id. at 519.
155. See id. at 518 (finding “[t]here are many matters upon which different states may agree that
can in no respect concern the United States”); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n,
434 U.S. 452, 459–60 (1978) (dismissing the idea that the Compact Clause is an absolute prohibition
on states entering into agreements.).
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states.156 In the foreign relations realm, the Court’s evolved “federal
supremacy” test has never been applied.157
The Court has crafted two related tests to determine whether an
agreement reaches the level of a compact, and if so, whether the compact
infringes on federal supremacy. The first is a four-part test regarding the
“classic indicia of a compact.”158 To find whether an agreement is a
compact under the Compact Clause, courts look at whether the agreement
(a) sets up a regulatory organization or body; (b) conditions action on
corresponding actions of other participants; (c) restricts a participant’s
ability to modify or repeal its own laws; and (d) reciprocates constraints
on each state’s regulations.159 The second test expanded on Field’s
original test for whether a compact actually violates “federal supremacy”
by examining if the “compact (a) authorized member states to do things
they could not do in the compact’s absence; (b) delegated sovereign
powers to an institution established by the Compact; or (c) restricted the
ability of states to exit the compact.”160 The crucial takeaway for states is
that “[w]ithout legally binding conditions or deep organizational
structures . . . no compact exists.”161
The states’ ability to engage in binding international agreements is
severely and explicitly restricted because the One Voice Doctrine is
rooted in the Treaty and Compact Clauses. However, states have seized
upon the fact that, while there may be a degree of distinction between a
treaty and compact, any such distinction is not legally binding—therefore
giving states a hook to engage with international actors.162
B.

Implicit Restraints: Foreign Commerce Clause and
Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption

Although commonly understood as a foundational maxim of United
States foreign policy, the Constitution never explicitly grants the federal
government exclusivity in every aspect of foreign relations.163 Where the
156. See Eaton, supra note 149, at 30–31 (noting “parallel construction” of the Compact Clause
creating both “the more developed interstate Compacts Clause and the less well-defined ‘Foreign’
Compacts Clause”).
157. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1088.
158. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175–76 (1985).
159. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1087–88.
160. See id. at 1086–87 (summarizing the Court’s reasoning in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1978)).
161. See id. at 1088.
162. See id. at 1074–76.
163. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”); Ramsey, supra note 63, at 346.
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Constitution expressly restricts state foreign agreements through the
Treaty and Compact Clauses,164 the full extent of federal capture of
foreign affairs is murky, having only been inferred or implied through the
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.165 These implied and
unenumerated powers are often referred to as “dormant preemption”
powers, generally accepted but not explicitly stated.166 Dormant
preemption includes both Dormant Foreign Affairs powers and Dormant
Commerce Clause powers.167
The Court has found that state laws that conflict with these powers may
be regarded as “an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs
which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the Congress.”168
Additionally, state laws that “prevent this Nation from ‘speaking with one
voice’ in regulating foreign commerce” may violate the
Foreign Commerce Clause.169 As such, federal exclusivity, or the primacy
of “one voice,” in international affairs has been a common thread
throughout numerous Supreme Court cases.170
The One Voice Doctrine’s power lies in the Supremacy Clause, which
states that “[the] Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and
all Treaties . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”171 The Supremacy Clause
therefore allows Congress to overrule or preempt a state law through
federal legislation.172 For foreign relations powers, the Supreme Court has
advanced notions of both conflict preemption (invalidating directly
conflicting state laws) and field preemption (exclusively reserving an
entire area of law to Congress).173 In the last half-century, the Court has
164. See supra section II.A.
165. See Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (“Although there is in the Constitution no
specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs,
there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation.”).
166. See David Sloss, California’s Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 56 WASHBURN
L.J. 507 (2017).
167. Id.
168. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
169. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).
170. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575–76 (1840); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“[T]he external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard
to state laws or policies. . . . [I]n respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.”).
171. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
172. See Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 376–77 (2015) (“Congress may consequently
pre-empt, i.e., invalidate, a state law through federal legislation. It may do so through express
language in a statute. But even where, as here, a statute does not refer expressly to pre-emption,
Congress may implicitly pre-empt a state law, rule, or other state action.”).
173. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432–34; Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388
(2000); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419 & n.11 (2003).
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started to further flesh out the general principle of federal foreign affairs
preemption.174
The Court’s current iteration of the One Voice Doctrine began with the
1968 case Zschernig v. Miller.175 In Zschernig, the Court used field
preemption to invalidate an Oregon statute that placed restrictions on
foreign citizens’ ability to make probate claims.176 The statute contained
restrictions that precluded “legatees residing in Communist countries”
from inheritances.177 While the Court generally deferred regulation of
trusts and estate distribution to the states, it held that where those laws
interfere with “the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign
policy . . . they must bow.”178 Despite no federal provisions on point and
a U.S. Department of Justice amicus brief179 explicitly stating that the
Oregon statute did not “unduly interfere[] with” international relations,180
the Court ruled that the influence of the Oregon statute had a “persistent
and subtle” effect on international relations that was enough to require its
demise.181 Although the Court narrowly confined its holding to the realm
of state probate statutes, the Court’s dicta are clearly hostile to the idea of
state laws antagonistic to United States foreign policy.182
That interpretation of federal preemption remained unchanged for
thirty years, until the Court held in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council183 that a state law cannot restrict which countries its own agencies
can engage in trade with.184 In 1996, Massachusetts passed the
Massachusetts Burma Law185 forbidding state agencies from purchasing
174. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 429.
175. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
176. See id. at 429.
177. See id. at 440.
178. See id. at 440–41.
179. An amicus curiae (Latin for “friend of the court”) brief is a legal brief submitted by an entity
who is not a party to the case. Cato at the Supreme Court, CATO INST.,
https://www.cato.org/about/cato-amicus-program [https://perma.cc/4KVC-RKZF]. In Zschernig, the
U.S. Department of Justice was not directly involved in the dispute but was an interested third party
who had a stake in the outcome of the ruling. 389 U.S. at 432.
180. See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434 (quoting the Department of Justice’s amicus curiae brief).
181. See id. at 440.
182. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the type of international preemption in Zschernig “resonates most audibly when a
state action ‘reﬂect[s] a state policy critical of foreign governments and involve[s] “sitting in
judgment” on them’” (alteration in original) (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION 164 (2d ed. 1996))).
183. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
184. Id. at 363–65.
185. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G–M (1997), invalidated by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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goods or services from companies that do business with the country of
Myanmar (formerly known as Burma).186 Shortly after the statute passed,
Congress passed a law granting the president the authority to enact such
measures. The Court reasoned that under the Supremacy Clause, the
Massachusetts law was invalidated by conflict preemption.187
Importantly, the Court’s opinion focused solely on the fact that the
congressional statute empowering the president preempted the state’s
sanctions.188 The Court held that the state sanctions directly contradicted
the federal act’s purpose—by impeding the president’s ability to “speak
for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments”—thus
the law was preempted.189
Three years later, in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi,190 the
Court expanded its reasoning in Crosby to include executive branch
agreements.191 The issue in Garamendi was a California law that required
any insurance company operating in California to publicly disclose
whether it had historical ties to Nazi Germany.192 This requirement
conflicted with an executive agreement with Germany aimed at
encouraging voluntary settlements of Holocaust claims.193 The Court
struck down the California law on the grounds that the law interfered with
the “[e]xecutive’s responsibility for foreign affairs.”194
However, the federal capture and dominance of foreign relations is not
absolute. U.S. sub-national actors continue to explore and push the
boundaries of their international powers.195
C.

Daylight for American Paradiplomacy?

Despite its strong hold over Supreme Court jurisprudence, not
everyone is convinced of the validity or premise of the One Voice
Doctrine.196 Critiques of the Doctrine include questioning its very

186. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 363.
187. See id. at 373.
188. See id. at 379.
189. See id. at 381, 386.
190. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
191. See id. at 396–400.
192. See id. at 401, 408–10.
193. See id. at 421.
194. See id. at 420, 423.
195. See infra section II.C.
196. See Cleveland, supra note 135, at 975.
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premise,197 how it is enforced,198 and its lack of functionality in a complex
and interconnected world.199 Furthermore, as the global paradiplomatic
movement grows, there will be increasing pressure on the federal
government to create space for sub-national actors to bolster American
foreign affairs.200
One example of states putting pressure on the federal government to
act was California’s push for international climate change policies.201
California created a state cap-and-trade program to incentivize companies
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.202 The program sets an allowable
amount of greenhouse gas emissions and creates a market that allows
companies to buy and trade allowances and offsets.203 California’s system
extends across international borders through a formal linkage with
Quebec’s cap-and-trade program.204
In United States v. California,205 the Trump Department of Justice filed
a complaint against the state of California for “unlawfully entering a cap
and trade agreement with the Canadian province of Quebec.”206 The
Department of Justice alleged the agreement violated “the Constitution by
complicating and burdening the United States’ task of regulating foreign

197. Id. (“It finds little support in the constitutional framework, which divides the foreign relations
powers among the three federal branches, and even less in the actual practice of the government.”).
198. See Paul B. Stephan, One Voice in Foreign Relations and Federal Common Law, 60 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1, 4 (2019) (“Although a harmonious national voice might be the best way to conduct foreign
relations, it does not follow that the federal judiciary is the best choirmaster.”).
199. See Moore, supra note 134, at 1044–45 (“Not only is the doctrine inconsistent with
constitutional text, structure, and history, as well as actual practice, but the doctrine applies along
various dimensions that present divergent questions, masks different theories of constitutional
interpretation, and ignores functional reasons for other or multiple voices in foreign affairs.”).
200. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, Gubernatorial Foreign Policy, 115 YALE L.J. 2380, 2410–14 (2006)
(noting the complexities of the international system are sometimes best suited to be addressed by subnational actors, not the federal government or its court system).
201. See United States v. California, No. 19-CV-02142, 2020 WL 4043034, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July
17, 2020), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 20-16789, 2021 WL 4240403 (9th Cir. Apr. 22,
2021).
202. See Cap-and-Trade Program: About, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/ourwork/programs/cap-and-trade-program/about [https://perma.cc/RRB6-GACX].
203. An allowance is one metric ton of permissible greenhouse gas emissions. See CAL. AIR RES.
BD., CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATION INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDANCE 12 (2012), https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/
sites/default/files/cap-and-trade/guidance/chapter1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EZ6-PSFQ].
204. See Cap-and-Trade Program: Program Linkage, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov
/our-work/programs/cap-and-trade-program/program-linkage [https://perma.cc/Y262-5AJS].
205. No. 19-CV-02142, 2020 WL 4043034 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2020).
206. See Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., United States Files Lawsuit Against
State of California for Unlawful Cap and Trade Agreement with the Canadian Province of Quebec
(Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-files-lawsuit-against-state-californiaunlawful-cap-and-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/B4HW-R6CB].
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commerce and negotiating competitive international agreements.”207
The Trump administration advanced four causes of action predicated
upon the Treaty Clause, Compact Clause, Foreign Affairs Preemption,
and Foreign Commerce Preemption.208 The arguments included a
straightforward violation (Treaty Clause), not receiving congressional
approval for the Agreement (Compact Clause), citing Garamendi to
support that California interfered with foreign policy (Foreign Affairs
Preemption), and that the cap-and-trade scheme infringed on Congress’
foreign commerce powers (Foreign Commerce Preemption).209 The
district court sided with California that the cap-and-trade agreement was
not a treaty,210 nor did it violate the Compact Clause211 or trigger federal
preemption,212 because the agreement did not impede the president’s
foreign policy “voice.”213 The Department of Justice filed notice of an
appeal, but it is unclear if the new Biden administration will pursue it.214
The lack of case law or consensus by scholars on whether states may
enter into agreements with other international governments leaves room
for U.S. states to experiment and test the bounds of their paradiplomatic
powers.215 Importantly, the Crosby and Zschernig holdings are premised
on American states engaging with nation states, not foreign sub-national
actors.216 The United States v. California case is one of only two cases
that involve an agreement between an American sub-national government
and foreign sub-national government.217 The other, Freeman v.

207. See Complaint at 13, California, No. 19-CV-02142, 2020 WL 4043034.
208. See id. at 14–16.
209. See id.
210. See United States v. California, 444 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
211. Id. at 1198.
212. California, No. 19-CV-02142, 2020 WL 4043034, at *7–10.
213. “The United States has failed to show that California’s program impermissibly intrudes on the
federal government’s foreign affairs power.” Id. at *12; see also Ellen M. Gilmer, Trump’s Legal
Attack Fails on California-Quebec Climate Pact (1), BLOOMBERG L. (July 17, 2020, 3:03 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/trumps-legal-attack-on-california-quebecclimate-pact-fails [https://perma.cc/4J8F-6VMK].
214. See Ellen M. Gilmer, California Seeks to Slow Down Climate Case Ahead of Biden Term,
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 31, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-andenergy/california-seeks-to-slow-down-climate-case-ahead-of-biden-term [https://perma.cc/3VDPA535].
215. See Jeremy Lawrence, Note, The Western Climate Initiative: Cross-Border Collaboration and
Constitutional Structure in the United States and Canada, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225, 1258–59 (2009).
216. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380–82 (2000) (“Finally, the
state Act is at odds with the President’s intended authority to speak for the United States among the
world’s nations . . . .”); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440–41 (1968) (holding that the effect of
a state law improperly affected residents of communist countries).
217. See Lawrence, supra note 215, at 1286 n.387.
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Trimble,218 involved an agreement between North Dakota and a Canadian
municipality on how to deal with surface water drainage.219 Although
confined to North Dakota jurisprudence, the agreement survived
challenges on both Treaty and Compact Clause grounds.220
Because there are so few cases involving agreements between
American states and international nation states, and no federal precedent
between sub-national actors, the ruling in United States v. California
represents an opening for American paradiplomacy. As noted by the Court
in Garamendi, there is a distinction between field preemption and conflict
preemption; without a “clear conflict between the policies adopted,” the
Court may not find conflict preemption.221
Despite hostile Supreme Court dicta regarding paradiplomacy,222 it
remains a gray area for cities and states to explore. Many U.S. subnational actors are already experimenting with informal agreements and
associations, and much of it goes unnoticed.223
III. TYPOLOGIES OF AMERICAN PARADIPLOMACY
Although the federal system of government in the United States is
predisposed to disfavor official attempts at sub-national diplomacy, many
examples exist.224 American paradiplomacy can be categorized into
roughly two camps: “sanctioned” and “unsanctioned.”225 “Sanctioned”
paradiplomacy is where a state enters into an agreement with another subnational entity, either another U.S. state or foreign government, and
receives explicit approval from Congress.226 “Unsanctioned”

218. 129 N.W. 83 (N.D. 1910); see also McHenry County v. Brady, 163 N.W. 540 (N.D. 1917)
(upholding Freeman).
219. See 129 N.W. at 84–85.
220. See Brady, 163 N.W. at 544 (distinguishing the holding in Holmes v. Jenninsen as between
national interest (extradition) and non-national interest (local water drainage)).
221. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003).
222. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570–71 (1840); Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437–
38 (1968).
223. See infra section III.A.
224. See Ku, supra note 200, at 2385–97 (providing examples of “gubernatorial” foreign policy, a
corollary for state paradiplomacy).
225. Use of these terms is not intended to imply any normative value on either type, but rather to
denote whether the agreement is the type that has, can, or should receive congressional approval. See
James F. Blumstein & Thomas J. Cheeseman, State Empowerment and the Compact Clause, 27 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 775, 787 (2019) (noting the existence of “Common Law Compacts” that do not
require congressional approval and “Constitutional Compacts” that require congressional approval).
226. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (holding that approval from Congress
“transforms an interstate compact . . . into a law of the United States”).
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paradiplomacy is the more common form, where agreements are
structured to specifically disclaim any binding effects so as to skirt the
constitutional issue.227 “Unsanctioned” paradiplomacy is further
segmented by the formality and structure of the agreements into
memoranda of understanding, membership in non-state actor
organizations, and self-imposed declarations.228
Recalling the two tests the Court has devised for state compacts, the
crucial takeaway for states is that “[w]ithout legally binding conditions or
deep organizational structures . . . no compact exists” to be struck
down.229 The result of this is that while the substance and purpose of
paradiplomatic efforts loosely resemble treaties and compacts, they often
explicitly disclaim legal effect so as not to be considered a treaty or
compact.230 Unfortunately, disclaiming binding effects means that
agreements lack the force of law and cannot be legally enforced either by
internal or external actors.231
A.

“Sanctioned” Compacts: Foreign State Agreements

The Foreign State Agreement (FSA) is the original paradiplomatic
vehicle in the United States.232 Functioning akin to—and based on the
same constitutional premise as—an interstate compact, FSAs are
agreements between an American sub-national government (city or state)
and a foreign sub-national government.233 Whereas the Treaty Clause
provides an absolute bar to states entering treaties, the language of the
Compact Clause allows states to enter into compacts and agreements,
pending congressional approval.234
While the interstate compact has a longer and richer history, with
roughly two hundred examples to draw from,235 its international
counterpart is relatively obscure.236 Although the Compact Clause does
227. See Wright, supra note 69, at 10487–88.
228. See Aaron Messing, Note, Nonbinding Subnational International Agreements: A Landscape
Defined, 30 GEO. ENV’T L. REV. 173, 185–86 (2017).
229. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1088.
230. See Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 743–44 (2010).
231. See Messing, supra note 228, at 184–85 (discussing the lack of international court access for
sub-national actors).
232. See Hollis, supra note 230, at 742; Hollis, supra note 152, at 1072 (noting that the FSA is
simply a variant of the Compact Clause).
233. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1071–74 (describing a brief history of “Foreign Compacts,”
which are the same as a Foreign State Agreement).
234. See infra section II.A.
235. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1074–75 n.16.
236. Id. at 1075.
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not expressly limit the substance of any compacts, Congress has approved
only a few FSAs, primarily between U.S. border states and their
international neighbors for the purposes of “coordinating
activities . . . . [regarding] (a) bridges; (b) fire fighting; (c) highways; and
(d) emergency management.”237 Congressional consent may be explicit
through the passage of a joint resolution or legislation.238 Or it may be
implied by “[a]n inference clear and satisfactory that
Congress . . . intended to consent.”239
Congress has not approved every FSA though, with one estimate that
states have entered “hundreds” of agreements with international actors.240
One suggestion for why FSAs are not approved by Congress has less to
do with congressional hostility and has more to do with states “simply
[not submitting] their arrangements with foreign powers to Congress for
approval.”241 One example of this dynamic was an agreement between
Missouri and Manitoba that would have escaped federal notice except for
a single U.S. Senator who requested the State Department look into it.242
Some scholars have noted that the monitoring and enforcement of FSAs
is nonexistent and operates on what is essentially the honor system.243
Congress has only ever refused to grant its consent to an FSA once: the
1968 Great Lakes Basin Compact (GLBC).244 The GLBC sought to
establish a commission of states and provinces to study and make
legislative recommendations.245 However, the GLBC ran into preemption
issues due to the 1909 passage of the Boundary Waters Treaty between
the U.S. and Canada.246 While Congress did grant consent to a version of
the Great Lakes Basin Compact,247 it explicitly limited participation to
U.S. states, effectively denying the FSA and converting it into an

237. Id. at 1076.
238. See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252,
276 (1991) (“Congress must exercise [its Compact Clause approval power] in conformity with the
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art. I, § 7.”).
239. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39, 60 (1870).
240. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1074–75, 1079.
241. See id. at 1078–79.
242. See id. at 1071–74. The Article further explores the relationship between the Legislative and
Executive branches, which exceeds the scope of this Comment.
243. See Eaton, supra note 149, at 35; Hollis, supra note 230, at 741–46.
244. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1078.
245. See Lauren Petrash, Comment, Great Lakes, Weak Policy: The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement and Compact and Non-Regulation of the Water
“Products” Industry, 39 U. MIA. INTER-AM. L. REV. 145, 153–54 (2007).
246. See Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between
the United States and Canada, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448.
247. Act of July 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414.

Mannix (Do Not Delete)

654

6/21/22 11:06 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:627

interstate compact.248 The GLBC was resurrected in 2005 as two distinct
mechanisms: the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
Agreement (Agreement) and the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Water Resources Compact (Compact).249 The Agreement includes both
U.S. states and Canadian provinces and reflects the lessons of the GLBC
by explicitly disclaiming any effects on federal laws and treaties.250 On
the other hand, the Compact comprising only the American states gained
Congress’ approval in 2008.251 The Compact also reflects the lessons of
the GLBC by excluding the Canadian provinces in order to implement a
binding legal requirement to comply with the Compact’s standards.252 The
exclusion of the Canadian provinces from the GLBC and 2005 Compact
shows that when Congress does pay attention, there is not always a
Federal appetite for entertaining international state compacts.253 The
decades-long saga of the GLBC, which culminated in a less-than-ideal
solution of the Agreement, highlights the danger FSAs face if they seek
congressional approval.
Adjacent to the FSA is the 1972 International Bridge Act (IBA).254
Although not itself an FSA, the IBA was a delegation of Congress’
Compact Clause approval authority to the State Department. Specifically,
the IBA created a very narrow method for states along the U.S. border to
enter into binding agreements (FSAs) with their foreign counterparts.255
These agreements were very narrowly cabined; they could only relate to
the creation, operation, and maintenance of bridges and tunnels that span
international borders.256 Finally, each IBA FSA required the approval of
the president, which was ultimately granted through “approval by the
Secretary of State.”257
B.

“Unsanctioned” Agreements: MOUs, NGOs, and Declarations
The other category of American paradiplomacy is the unsanctioned, or

248. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1078 n.33.
249. See Petrash, supra note 245, at 156.
250. See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, Can.U.S., Arts. 700–03, Dec. 13, 2005.
251. See Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub. L. No. 110-342,
§ 7.3(2)(a)–(b), 122 Stat. 3739, 3761 (2008).
252. See id. § 1.3.
253. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1094.
254. Act of Sept. 26, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-434, § 3, 86 Stat. 731, 731 (codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 535a).
255. 33 U.S.C. § 535a.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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non-binding, agreement. This is the most popular form of paradiplomacy
because these agreements are structured in such a way as to avoid
constitutional issues.258 By avoiding language that creates legal or
political obligations, these agreements do not trigger federal action.259
There are three sub-types of non-binding agreements: memoranda of
understanding (MOU), third-party representations, and unilateral
declarations.260
1.

Memoranda of Understandings

Memoranda of Understanding are international agreements whereby
sub-national actors create a public document of shared values and commit
to adhering to guiding principles.261 These agreements are less a contract
of cooperation between sub-national actors and more of a public
commitment to shared principles and self-contained behavior.262 These
commitments are made by the sub-national governments and therefore
carry political weight, although they are not binding.263
An example of a current MOU agreement is the Under2 Coalition, an
international agreement to reduce greenhouse gasses.264 California
worked directly with Baden-Wurttemberg, a German sub-national state,
to spearhead this initiative, which was originally called the
Under2MOU.265 Improving the original framework of the Under2MOU
by
“working
together
and
building
on
[international]
agreements . . . subnational governments, together with interested
nations, can help to accelerate the world’s response to climate change and
provide a model for broader international cooperation among nations.”266

258. See Hollis, supra note 152, at 1089; see also infra Part II for an examination of the
constitutional issues.
259. Id. at 1089–90.
260. See Messing, supra note 228, at 185. Messing includes a fourth subtype, near-binding
arrangements, which I combine with FSAs in supra section III.B.
261. See id. at 188.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See CLIMATE GRP., GLOBAL CLIMATE LEADERSHIP: UNDER2 MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING, https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/Under2%20MOU
_English_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TRZ-Q9G8].
265. See Under 2 MOU—Inspiring Regional Leadership on Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Sept. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Under2MOU],
https://unfccc.int/news/under-2-mou-inspiring-regional-leadership-on-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/GQ92-4EGP].
266. See CLIMATE GRP., GLOBAL CLIMATE LEADERSHIP MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(MOU) 1, https://www.theclimategroup.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/under2-mou-with-addendumenglish-a4.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QRN-6MEZ].
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The Under2 Coalition includes over 500 private organizations and over
260 governments at all levels.267 The Under2 Coalition specifically
disclaims the ability to legally bind, calling its members mere
“signatories.”268
2.

Third Party Representation

Third-party representation is best understood as sub-national actors
becoming members in a non-governmental club, whereby they commit to
the requirements of membership.269 Often the “club” is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that serves as a resource for
information, collaboration, and coordination.270 The primary benefit of
this form is that the administrative costs of organizing and governing the
group are outsourced to the NGO.271
The Western Compact Initiative (WCI) is a prototypical example of
this type of non-binding agreement.272 The WCI was originally an MOU,
where the founding states signed the memorandum to adopt state policies
and regulations to encourage zero-emission vehicles and lower climate
pollutants.273 The original iteration of WCI folded when a number of
members dropped out of the MOU due to the unwillingness or inability to
pass actual legislation.274 The new third-party organization, WCI, Inc., is
a non-profit corporation that provides technical services and manages the
relationship between the remaining members of California, Quebec, and
Nova Scotia.275
3.

Unilateral Declarations

Unilateral declarations are more than mere statements; they are policy
positions or self-policing regulations enacted by a sub-national actor.276
These declarations are often aimed at influencing other actors to adopt

267. See About Us, CLIMATE GRP., https://www.theclimategroup.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/
J7YC-USEA].
268. See CLIMATE GRP., supra note 266, at 11.
269. See Messing, supra note 228, at 190.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 192.
272. See Lawrence, supra note 215, at 1227–28.
273. See Under2MOU, supra note 265.
274. See Sonja Klinsky, Bottom-Up Policy Lessons Emerging from the Western Climate Initiative’s
Development Challenges, 13 CLIMATE POL’Y 143, 152–56 (2013).
275. See Homepage, WCI, INC., http://www.wci-inc.org [https://perma.cc/3NFP-D6LY].
276. See Messing, supra note 228, at 192.
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similar positions.277 More than mere performance, these unilateral
declarations can have significant international impacts. In the late 1970s
and early 1980s, a number of American cities and states enacted antiApartheid sanctions against enterprises doing business with the
government of South Africa.278 When Massachusetts barred its state
agencies from engaging with companies that did business with Myanmar,
it unilaterally declared sanctions on Myanmar.279
C.

Legitimacy and Authority Deficits

The status quo of U.S. sub-national actors tiptoeing around federal
preemption or hoping the federal government simply ignores their foreign
relations efforts is untenable in an increasingly interconnected world with
increasingly complex issues. In the absence of federal leadership on
crucial issues, sub-national actors are pushing the bounds of “foreign
affairs federalism”280 and entering into transborder agreements that often
blur the line between binding contracts and “handshake” agreements.281
However, due to the explicit non-binding nature of these agreements, the
requirements and obligations negotiated between the parties are
unenforceable.282
The unenforceable nature of these agreements removes the incentive to
comply with the obligations.283 Consider the climate change free-rider
dilemma: when nations or sub-national actors enter into international
agreements that require each party to ratchet down their emissions in order
to combat climate change, the program works best (and all benefit) when
each actually follows through and reduces emissions.284 Often there is a
cost associated with reducing emissions that is borne by each party.285 But
if one party decides it does not want to bear that cost, it can still benefit

277. See id.
278. See Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Affairs of Federal Systems: A National Perspective on
the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015, 1035 (2001).
279. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 383–84 (2000).
280. Sharmila L. Murthy, The Constitutionality of State and Local “Norm Sustaining” Actions on
Global Climate Change: The Foreign Affairs Federalism Grey Zone, 5 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFFS. 447,
451 (2020).
281. Fabien Gélinas, The Constitution of Agreement: A Brief Look at Sub-Federal Cross-Border
Cooperation, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1179, 1180–84.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1189.
284. Natalie M. Roy, Comment, Climate Change’s Free Rider Problem: Why We Must Relinquish
Freedom to Become Free, 45 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 821, 837–39 (2021).
285. Id.
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from the other parties reducing their emissions.286
As most paradiplomatic agreements explicitly disclaim legally binding
effects, there is no legal carrot or stick to force the free-riding party to
require the free-riding party to fulfill its obligations.287 Some scholars
suggest that “shame” is a particularly effective enforcement mechanism,
even in the absence of binding legal effects.288 For the more pessimistic,
or those living in the post-”alternative facts”289 world, shame seems to be
losing its utility as a political tool.290 Furthermore, as the United States v.
California case highlights, sub-national actors may face a hostile federal
government if their paradiplomatic efforts are considered politically
unpalatable by the current presidential administration.291 The waning
effectiveness of political commitments and reputational enforcement,
coupled with the looming threat of legal action from an opposition-party
administration, highlights the need for reform on the paradiplomatic front.
IV. PARADIPLOMACY IN THE CASCADIA MEGAREGION
The Cascadia megaregion of North America is home to three major
metropolitan areas with a combined population of almost ten million in
2016.292 That number has likely grown substantially as Vancouver,
Seattle, and Portland experienced huge influxes of urban migration over
the past decade.293 The region expects another 30% increase in population
286. Id.
287. See Messing, supra note 228, at 198.
288. See id. (suggesting that the political shame associated with pulling out of nonbinding
international agreements makes them “politically binding”).
289. Connor O’Brien, Conway: Spicer Presented ‘Alternative Facts’ on Inauguration Crowds,
POLITICO (Jan. 22, 2017, 12:04 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/alternative-factskellyanne-conway-233998 [https://perma.cc/QHG3-HKZC].
290. Cf. Jack Holmes, The Death of Shame, or the Rise of Shamelessness?, ESQUIRE (Jan. 31,
2018), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a15940835/trump-shame-shamelessness/
[https://perma.cc/376L-F36A].
291. Richard Frank, Court Rejects Trump Administration’s Cap-and-Trade Lawsuit Against
California, LEGALPLANET (Mar. 24, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/2020/03/24/court-rejects-trumpadministrations-cap-and-trade-lawsuit-against-california/ [https://perma.cc/2FT8-KR9V].
292. See CITY OF VANCOUVER SOC. POL’Y & PROJECTS, VANCOUVER CITY SOCIAL INDICATORS
PROFILE 2020, at 7 (2020), https://vancouver.ca/files/cov/social-indicators-profile-city-ofvancouver.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBT2-EGAK] (approximately 2.5 million); Seattle-TacomaBellevue, WA Metro Area, CENSUS REP. (2020), https://censusreporter.org/profiles/31000US42660seattle-tacoma-bellevue-wa-metro-area [https://perma.cc/5394-DTTN] (approximately 4 million);
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA Metro Area, CENSUS REP. (2020),
https://censusreporter.
org/profiles/31000US38900-portland-vancouver-hillsboro-or-wa-metro-area
[https://perma.cc/
628Z-MAP3] (approximately 2.5 million).
293. See Kenneth Chan, Metro Vancouver Is the 12th Fastest Growing Region in North America,
DAILY HIVE (June 12, 2020, 9:42 PM), https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/metro-vancouver-
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by 2050.294 This population boom created a massive infrastructure deficit,
both in terms of housing and transportation.295 Cascadia’s population
increase also coincides with a warming climate and its attendant issues,
many of which are not adequately being addressed.296
The Cascadia megaregion, perhaps owing to the entrepreneurial spirit
of its residents,297 is no stranger to paradiplomacy.298 The sub-national
actors in the Pacific Northwest have come together to address these issues,
often in the absence of their respective national governments.299 The
primary focus of Cascadian paradiplomatic efforts have been aimed at
environmental and climate issues, but newer efforts are expanding that
sphere to include regional governance and economic coordination.300
population-growth-2019 [https://perma.cc/J46T-LFY3]; Report: Seattle Is One of the FastestGrowing Large US Cities, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Sept. 2, 2020, 11:10 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2020/09/02/report-seattle-among-fastest-growing-largecities.html#:~:text=The%20study%20found%20Seattle%20had,during%20that%20time%20was%2
02.38%25 [https://perma.cc/GA95-X7NE]; Elise Herron, Oregon Gained More than 400,000
Residents in the Last Decade, a New Portland State University Population Study Shows,
WILLAMETTE WK. (Nov. 16, 2019, 5:35 AM), https://www.wweek.com/news/2019/11/16/oregongained-over-400000-residents-in-the-last-decade-a-new-portland-state-university-population-studyshows [https://perma.cc/SMN6-6AKG].
294. See CASCADIA INNOVATION CORRIDOR, CASCADIA VISION 2050: HOW THE CASCADIA
INNOVATION CORRIDOR CAN SERVE AS A GLOBAL MODEL FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 3 (2020),
https://connectcascadia.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Cascadia-Vision-2050_Published.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LP3B-B6YV].
295. See id. at 4.
296. See Peter Fairley, How Cascadia Can Prevent Another “Lost Decade” in the Fight Against
Climate
Change,
JEFFERSON
PUB.
RADIO
(Dec.
11,
2021,
11:01
AM),
https://www.ijpr.org/environment-energy-and-transportation/2021-12-11/how-cascadia-canprevent-another-lost-decade-in-the-fight-against-climate-change [https://perma.cc/8LQZ-8ZDE].
297. Seattle is the home of Amazon, Boeing, Costco, Microsoft, Nordstrom, Starbucks, REI, and
Weyerhaeuser. About Seattle, SEATTLE CHAMBER OF COM., https://www.seattlechamber.com/pages
/aboutseattle/ [https://perma.cc/NX4S-7AN4].
298. For example: Washington State has the Governor’s Office of International Relations, Office
of International Relations, WASH. OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR, https://www.governor.wa.gov/officegovernor/office/office-international-relations [https://perma.cc/5XMT-98W3]; Seattle has an Office
of Intergovernmental Affairs, International Affairs, CITY OF SEATTLE, http://www.seattle.gov/oir/in
ternational-affairs [https://perma.cc/ZXY7-NM46]; Oregon does not have a statewide office for
international relations, but Portland has an International Relations program, International Relations,
CITY OF PORTLAND, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/ogr/65019 [https://perma.cc/MSD6-W93T];
British Columbia has the Intergovernmental Relations Secretariat, Intergovernmental Relations
Secretariat, BRITISH COLUMBIA, https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/organizationalstructure/office-of-the-premier/intergovernmental-relations-secretariat (last visited May 29, 2022);
and Vancouver has an External Relations Department, External Relations Department, METRO
VANCOUVER, http://www.metrovancouver.org/about/departments/external-relations/Pages/
default.aspx [https://perma.cc/4YWR-8QEY].
299. See Dan Fumano, Cascadia Leaders to ‘Swing for the Fences’ on Problems Facing Region,
World, VANCOUVER SUN (Oct. 2, 2019), https://vancouversun.com/news/local-news/cascadialeaders-to-swing-for-the-fences-on-problems-facing-region-world [https://perma.cc/UT65-S3RH].
300. See infra notes 301, 312, 319 and accompanying text.
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Climate Change Paradiplomacy in Cascadia

One of the first major international paradiplomatic efforts by American
sub-national actors on the West Coast, the Western Climate Initiative
(WCI) promotes a general goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions
among western states.301 Originally two separate agreements between
western302 and southwestern303 states, the initiatives merged in 2007.304
Over the next two years, four Canadian provinces and two more states
joined, and in 2010, WCI published its plans for collaborating to reduce
greenhouse emissions throughout its member jurisdictions.305
Importantly, the agreements each jurisdiction drafted and signed onto
were specifically designed to circumvent the Compact Clause
requirements and the federal government.306 By designing the WCI as a
voluntary and—more importantly—non-binding agreement,307 the
drafters of the agreement were likely able to move more quickly and more
freely as they did not require federal blessing. Furthermore, the
voluntariness avoided paradiplomatic issues when British Columbia (and
subsequent Canadian provinces) joined.308
Unfortunately, many of the states dropped out of the WCI in 2011 when
the actual implementation of cap-and-trade policies failed to gain traction
in the various statehouses due to the global recession that began in
2008.309 The fundamental structure of the WCI shifted from an
“unsanctioned” compact to third-party representation with the formation
of the Western Climate Initiative, Inc. (“WCI, Inc.”), a non-profit tasked
with organizing the cap-and-trade markets of the three remaining
jurisdictions.310 WCI, Inc. was one of the named defendants in the Trump
DOJ lawsuit against California’s participation in the California-Quebec
301. See Lawrence, supra note 215, at 1225–26.
302. California, Oregon, and Washington created the West Coast Global Warming Initiative in
2003. History, W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://westernclimateinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=29&Itemid=44 [https://perma.cc/U3RE-HXEZ].
303. Arizona and New Mexico created the Southwest Climate Change Initiative in 2006. See id.
304. See id.
305. See W. CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN FOR THE WCI REGIONAL PROGRAM (2010),
https://wcitestbucket.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/amazon-s3-bucket/documents/en/wci-programdesign-archive/WCI-ProgramDesign-20100727-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6ZD-266R].
306. See Lawrence, supra note 215, at 1229, 1276–78.
307. See id. at 1276–78.
308. See id. at 1269 (noting that the structure of the WCI avoids constitutional problems).
309. See Geoffrey Craig, Six US States Leave the Western Climate Initiative, S&P GLOB. (Nov. 18,
2011), https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/111811-sixus-states-leave-the-western-climate-initiative [https://perma.cc/86AE-EGWR].
310. See Program Design and Implementation, WCI INC., https://wci-inc.org/our-work/programdesign-and-implementation [https://perma.cc/EZ5H-AK2V].
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cap-and-trade program.311
Similarly, the Pacific Coast Collaborative (PCC)312 is a multi-level
organization representing two countries, four states,313 and six major cities
along the pacific coast.314 The stated vision of the organization is to
“[d]ramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions and create a vibrant, low
carbon regional economy by transforming energy systems, buildings,
transportation, and food waste management.”315 It accomplishes these
goals by providing a forum for the discussion and dissemination of
technical guidance, expertise, and assistance to its member
jurisdictions.316 Notably, from a cross-border perspective, it stated that
“[w]here possible, California, British Columbia, Oregon and Washington
will link programs for consistency and predictability and to expand
opportunities to grow the region’s low-carbon economy.”317
The ambition and pledges in the PCC agreement are tempered by the
closing provision that “[t]his Action Plan shall have no legal effect;
impose no legally binding obligation enforceable in any court of law or
other tribunal of any sort, nor create any funding expectation; nor shall
our jurisdictions be responsible for the actions of third parties or
associates.”318
B.

Economic and Social Responsibility Paradiplomacy

The Cascadia Innovation Corridor (CIC) exemplifies the complexity of
many paradiplomatic initiatives. The CIC is a public-private partnership
311. See United States v. California, No. 19-CV-02142, 2020 WL 4043034 (E.D. Cal. July 17,
2020), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 20-16789, 2021 WL 4240403 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2021).
312. See MEMORANDUM TO ESTABLISH THE PACIFIC COAST COLLABORATIVE (June 30, 2008),
https://46h83069gmc37jdhm425hbh3-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
Memorandum-PCC_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8J8-D38L].
313. Three U.S. states and the Canadian Province of British Columbia. About, PAC. COAST
COLLABORATIVE, https://pacificcoastcollaborative.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/Y6UZ-J7FU].
314. United States and Canada; British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, and California;
Vancouver, Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles. Id.
315. Governor Brown Joins Oregon, Washington, British Columbia Leaders to Combat Climate
Change, OFF. OF GOVERNOR EDMUND G. BROWN JR. (Oct. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Governor Brown
Joins], https://www.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2013/10/28/news18284/index.html [https://perma.cc/R8V
H-WWEJ].
316. See PAC. COAST COLLABORATIVE, PACIFIC COAST COLLABORATIVE CLIMATE AND ENERGY
ACTION PLAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (2013), https://www.energy.ca.gov/sites/default/files/201912/pacific_coast_ada.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF8L-LQSP].
317. See West Coast Governments Agree to Cooperate on Climate Change, Environment, Trade
and Overdose Crisis, WASH. GOVERNOR JAY INSLEE (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.governor.wa.go
v/news-media/west-coast-governments-agree-cooperate-climate-change-environment-trade-andoverdose [https://perma.cc/8P55-UPX8].
318. Governor Brown Joins, supra note 315.
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aimed at harmonizing efforts to build a modern and socially responsible
megaregion.319 The cumulative vision of the CIC is summarized by its
Cascadia Vision 2050 platform, which “proposes a bold approach to
sustainable growth by building hub cities on underdeveloped lands and
connecting them to the larger centers via high-speed transit.”320
The coordination required to effectively plan and implement activities
and initiatives contemplated by the CIC involves a dizzying number of
local, regional, state, federal, and international governmental bodies.321 At
the national level, diplomatic relations between the United States and
Canada would involve a number of federal agencies.322 At the
state/province level, Washington and B.C. legislatures and administrative
agencies become involved, not just with their international counterparts,
but their national governments as well.323 Regional and local governments
add in approximately twenty-five more individual units of government
and their coordination.324
One example of paradiplomacy-adjacent cross-border collaboration is
the Cascadia Urban Analytics Cooperative (CUAC), a research
collaboration between Microsoft, the University of Washington (UW),
and the University of British Columbia (UBC).325 A sub-unit of the CUAC
is the Cascadia Law Initiative (CLI), a cooperative venture of faculty and
students at UW and UBC law schools.326
The CLI analyzed the legal barriers to a CIC-proposed project: an
autonomous car lane or high-speed train line between Vancouver and
Seattle.327 This proposed autonomous-car lane is not only a massive
“engineering, technological, construction and management undertaking,”
but would also “involve multiple levels and types of government bodies
in both countries.”328 Such an undertaking is one that is best handled by
state officials and regional actors with broader political support and local

319. See CASCADIA INNOVATION CORRIDOR, “CASCADIA VISION 2050” OFFERS PATH TO
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH IN THE CASCADIA MEGA-REGION (2020), https://connectcascadia.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/Cascadia-Release_2020-Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X4C-BV47].
320. Id. at 1.
321. See CLI Paper, supra note 89.
322. See id.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See Emily Keller, CUAC Releases Program Report Highlighting Collaborative Research
Across Cascadia, URBAN@UW (Mar. 31, 2020), https://urban.uw.edu/news/cuac-releases-programreport-highlighting-collaborative-research-across-cascadia/ [https://perma.cc/C9LD-ZWKF].
326. See CLI Paper, supra note 89, at 1, 3.
327. See id. at 4, 104.
328. See id. at 104.
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knowledge or expertise.329 The federal oversight of every paradiplomatic
effort is neither possible nor desirable, as most efforts are inherently local
issues.330 Paradiplomacy should be encouraged at the federal level as a
collaborative, not combative, undertaking.
V.

EMBRACING AMERICAN PARADIPLOMACY

For too long the federal government has been the only voice allowed
to speak for United States foreign policy. The federal government will,
and should, remain the main voice of United States foreign policy;
however, it should allow the states to become the backup singers.331 To
belabor the metaphor, allowing sub-national actors to find their own
foreign policy voices, so long as they are not dissonant to federal foreign
policy, presents a richer and more powerful voice to address global issues.
This would, hopefully, promote and advance American foreign policy and
strengthen the ties between the federal government and sub-national
actors.
For American sub-national actors to better contribute to American
foreign policy, this Comment suggests Congress authorize the creation of
a State Department office to recognize, embrace, and formalize FSAs and
paradiplomacy at the federal level. The near-complete absence of case law
on the Compact Clause and continued congressional silence on FSAs332
suggests that there may be room within American foreign policy for states
and cities to play active roles. Where the federal government cannot, or
chooses not to, act on its own, cities and states can experiment with
different international arrangements, carbon cap-and-trade markets, and
trans-border urban planning that carry with them binding obligations.
A.

Create a State Department Office for FSAs

The federal government should allow the states to harmonize with “one
voice” by entering into their own agreements with the approval of the
State Department. Owing to the gridlock and its inability to pass even the
329. See Swiney, supra note 6, at 227–28.
330. However, the federal government should remain keenly interested in certain types of
paradiplomatic efforts, specifically around sensitive topics like national security. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936); cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433
(1920).
331. See Julia Spiegel, Embracing Foreign Affairs Federalism in a Post-Trump Era, LAWFARE
(Mar. 3, 2021, 8:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/embracing-foreign-affairs-federalism-posttrump-era [https://perma.cc/7UKM-D4RT] (“[T]he U.S. should embrace the role that states and
localities play as force multipliers and divisors of solutions to the foreign policy dilemmas the global
community faces.”).
332. See Eaton, supra note 149, at 33.
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most important bills,333 Congress should embrace the power of
paradiplomacy and delegate the authority to approve foreign state
agreements to the executive branch.334
Congress has the ability to grant its authority through the creation of
executive agencies, and has done so since the beginning of the nation.335
Delegating the authority to approve FSAs would fall squarely in the
“intelligible principle”336 that Congress does not have the capacity to
review and approve each FSA.337 Interestingly, this has already been done
on a small scale with the International Bridge Act.338
The State Department’s career civil servants have the capacity and
institutional competence to work with states to craft FSAs that do not run
afoul of federal supremacy or the foreign policy goals of the
administration. Congress and, by delegation, the State Department can
create standardized language and administrative processes for approval
and facilitate the integration of FSAs into a broader foreign policy
platform. The State Department could serve as technical advisor and
provide advice and counsel to states and cities. This would enhance the
sophistication of U.S. paradiplomacy and better ensure American interests
are furthered through these agreements. Furthermore, this arrangement
would comport with Supreme Court precedent focusing foreign relations
power in the hands of the executive branch.339 This alignment would also
dramatically reduce the likelihood of an executive branch suing a state

333. See Gus Wezerek, 20 Years of Congress’s Budget Procrastination, in One Chart,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 7, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/20-years-ofcongresss-budget-procrastination-in-one-chart [https://perma.cc/CWZ5-KPG5].
334. This suggestion is similar to a proposal to create an “office of subnational diplomacy within
the State Department” suggested by a Brookings Institute report. See Anthony F. Pipa & Max
Bouchet, Partnership Among Cities, States, and the Federal Government: Creating an Office of
Subnational Diplomacy at the US Department of State, BROOKINGS (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/partnership-among-cities-states-and-the-federal-governmentcreating-an-office-of-subnational-diplomacy-at-the-us-department-of-state/ [https://perma.cc/SG8D8NME]; cf. Office of Treaty Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/bureausoffices/treaty-affairs/#tab-5 [https://perma.cc/L9ZF-8H2P] (the stated mission of the Office of Treaty
Affairs is to “provide[] advice and support on matters involving U.S. and international treaty law and
practice”).
335. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 383 (1789) (statement of Rep. Elias Boudinot) (noting that the
Constitution allows Congress to create “departments of an executive nature in aid of the President”).
336. The “intelligible principle” test is derived from J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized [to act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”).
337. Id. at 407 (“If Congress were to be required to [approve everything], it would be impossible
to exercise the power at all.”).
338. See supra section III.A; see also 33 U.S.C. § 535a.
339. Cf. Hollis, supra note 152, at 1101–02.
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over an approved FSA by removing the basis of nearly all of the charges
in United States v. California.340
Admittedly, integrating the FSA approval process into the executive
branch runs into some of the same problems that prompted sub-national
actors to seek out the FSA in the first place. Chief among these issues is
how the executive branch can change parties every four years. Because
FSAs are often the result of years of careful paradiplomacy and can be
extremely technical and nuanced,341 the vacillations of presidential
priorities may inhibit this system. One potential solution for this problem
is for congress to structure the enabling act of this agency to insulate
approved agreements from these forces. This could be done through the
Appointments Clause342 and carefully structuring the agency leadership as
a multi-member commission343 or establishing statutory qualifications.344
FSAs can become an official vehicle for American paradiplomacy,
which could be regulated and tracked with much greater fidelity than the
current system.345 By placing the authority to approve FSAs in the
executive branch, it would not only improve efficiency, but it would also
ensure that approved FSAs would be in harmony with the “one voice”346
of the executive. Delegating the power to approve compacts to the State
Department would revive the FSA as an official paradiplomatic tool in the
American foreign policy arsenal.
B.

The Future of Cascadian Paradiplomacy

The Cascadia region has long been considered a hub of innovation and
home to people with great ambitions and the gumption to match it. Home
to a number of the largest technology companies, one of the largest
international non-profits, world-class research organizations,
340. See United States v. California, No. 19-CV-02142, 2020 WL 4043034 (E.D. Cal. July 17,
2020), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 20-16789, 2021 WL 4240403 (9th Cir. Apr. 22, 2021).
341. For example, the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact was the
result of decades of negotiation starting in 1968, was signed without Canadian members in 2005, and
was ratified by Congress in 2008. See Petrash, supra note 245, at 152–57.
342. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
343. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (where Congress created the “Securities and Exchange
Commission . . . composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate”).
344. For example, Congress enacted statutory requirements that Federal Election Commission
members must serve six-year terms and no more than three may be from the same political party. See
52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1)–(2).
345. See Hollis, supra note 230, at 744 (“The states have concluded more than two hundred FSAs
in the last ten years alone. And these numbers certainly undercount the actual practice, since no formal
mechanisms exist for collecting or monitoring FSAs.” (emphasis omitted)).
346. See supra Part II.
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internationally acclaimed universities, and a reputation for finding
solutions to difficult problems, the Cascadia region is perfect for
becoming a laboratory to explore the future of sub-national relations. The
strong regional identity, close cross-border ties, and long history of subnational cooperation make Cascadia an ideal testing ground for the future
of North American paradiplomacy.
The long-term survival of the Cascadian megaregion will depend on
the ability of the sub-national actors of the region—the cities, counties,
and states—to come together and create a regional plan. Building on the
Cascadia Innovation Corridor’s efforts,347 this regional plan should
emphasize combatting climate change and infrastructure decay, as well as
promoting sustainable growth. In order for this regional plan to be
effective, it should be formalized through a binding legal agreement in the
form of an FSA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The era of the federal government being the sole voice in American
international relations should end. This Comment does not suggest a
wholesale constitutional regime change where states become the primary
focal point of international relations. Instead, the federal government
needs to modernize its conception of international relations to allow states
to innovate and address local and global issues. By loosening its grip on
international relations, the federal government may enhance American
foreign relations and allow for greater flexibility for megaregions like
Cascadia to effectively address issues.

347. See CASCADIA INNOVATION CORRIDOR, supra note 294.

